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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter is before this court on a Petition for 
Enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations 
Board ("Board"). The Board had subject matter jurisdiction 
under Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA") which authorizes it to prevent unfair labor 
practices. See 29 U.S.C. S 160(a). We have jurisdiction to 
review a Petition for Enforcement pursuant to Section 10 of 
the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. S 160(e). 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. FACTUAL HISTORY 
 
Local 1576 of the International Brotherhood of Electric 
Workers is a labor organization that represents employees 
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of nuclear facilities. It is also a part of a larger organization 
known as System Council U-2 that represents 14 different 
locals. Although Local 1576 is a separate entity, System 
Council serves as its spokesperson in negotiations, 
arbitrations, and grievance procedures. In addition, Local 
1576 is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO ("International"), an even larger 
organization that represents its members by assisting the 
locals with negotiations and arbitrations.1 
 
Public Service Electric and Gas Company ("PSE&G") is a 
utility that, inter alia, operates several nuclear generating 
stations on Artificial Island, Salem County, New Jersey. 
Local 1576 represents several groups of PSE&G's 
employees, including PSE&G's Radiation Protection 
Technicians ("RPT") whose function is to ensure safety by 
monitoring the radiological environment at various plants. 
 
In the course of its normal operations, PSE&G undergoes 
"outages" in which a plant will go off-line or shut down for 
repairs or maintenance. Outages can last several months 
and either are planned or conducted on an emergency 
basis. During an outage, additional RPTs are required to 
monitor the plant. PSE&G traditionally has supplemented 
its RPT staff during outages by contracting with two 
independent contractors, Bartlett Nuclear and NSS 
Numanco. 
 
Local 1576, System Council, and PSE&G are parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement effective from May 1, 1992, 
through April 30, 1996. Under the collective bargaining 
agreement, PSE&G is permitted to contract with 
independent contractors such as Bartlett and Numanco as 
long the independent contracting arrangement does not 
result in lay-off, curtailment, or downsizing of employees 
that Local 1576 represents. In addition, even though 
International is not a party to the collective bargaining 
agreement, the agreement provides that PSE&G agrees to 
recognize representatives of International as the 
representatives of Local 1576. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In its brief the Board explains that there have been changes to the 
union hierarchy that we describe, but as a matter of convenience we 
refer to the structure in place at the time of the events in this case. 
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In 1988, International began attempts to organize groups 
of employees of independent contractors such as Bartlett 
("independent RPTs"). Beginning in the late 1980's, 
however, International began to question whether the 
independent RPTs were in fact controlled by the utilities 
that they serviced. Suspicions as to the true relationship 
between the independent RPTs and the utilities first arose 
when, during a hearing on an unfair labor practice charge, 
Bartlett took the position that a certain utility actually 
made the decisions and exercised control over the 
independent RPTs. Subsequently, in an unrelated unfair 
labor practice case, an administrative law judge held a 
utility, and not the independent contracting firm, liable for 
not hiring independent RPTs. In addition, when 
International attempted to organize independent RPTs, the 
independent contracting firms took the position, with which 
the Board agreed, that the utilities controlled the terms of 
the employment of the independent RPTs and that the 
contracting firms therefore would be unable to engage in a 
meaningful collective bargaining relationship. As a 
consequence of these three incidents, International 
abandoned attempts to organize independent RPTs and, 
instead, turned its attention to establishing the relationship 
among the independent RPTs, their contracting firms, and 
the utilities they serviced. 
 
In order to ascertain the relationship among these 
entities, International prepared a questionnaire in 1993 
directed at determining the financial relationship between 
the utilities and the independent contracting firms and the 
degree of supervision that the utilities exercise over the 
independent RPTs. The questionnaire was comprehensive, 
consisting of eight pages containing 79 questions. See app. 
at 136-43. International forwarded this questionnaire along 
with a sample cover letter directly or indirectly to each of its 
locals, including Local 1576, that represented in-house 
RPTs at utilities that used certain independent contracting 
firms. International asked that the locals in turn forward a 
request to their utilities to answer the questionnaire. 
 
During this same time period, System Council and Local 
1576 were experiencing problems with PSE&G resulting 
from its subcontracting arrangements. For example, since 
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approximately 1991, the local's business agents had been 
complaining that they were having difficulties obtaining 
information from PSE&G concerning its subcontracting 
relationships. System Council asserted that while PSE&G 
would inform Local 1576 when it was retaining an 
independent contracting firm, it would not provide any 
information as to the nature of the work to be performed, 
how many independent RPTs were being hired, how long 
they would be retained, or who would supervise them. See 
app. at 255. System Council also asserted that while 
outages normally lasted only several months, PSE&G 
retained many independent RPTs during non-outage 
periods. In addition, System Council asserted, without 
contradiction, that beginning in 1990 and continuing to the 
time of the hearing in this case, there had been little or no 
expansion in the number of union-represented RPTs at 
PSE&G. Id. at 256. These factors convinced System Council 
that PSE&G was retaining independent RPTs to avoid 
promoting or hiring other employees into the ranks of 
union-represented RPTs and that this conduct was affecting 
union employees at PSE&G adversely. Id. 
 
On January 18, 1990, System Council and Local 1576 
jointly filed a grievance alleging that PSE&G violated the 
collective bargaining agreement "by the de facto creation 
and maintenance of a `parallel work force' through multiple 
subcontracting of bargaining unit work ordinarily 
performed by . . . bargaining unit employees." In 1993, this 
grievance and other similar grievances against various 
companies were combined for arbitration. Soon after the 
start of the arbitration hearing, however, the parties 
suspended the arbitration process because they began 
engaging in what they described as "mutual gains" 
bargaining. Though the parties resolved several issues 
through this bargaining process, System Council asserts, 
without contradiction, that they did not resolve the issue 
concerning independent RPTs performing bargaining unit 
work. 
 
System Council received the International letter and 
questionnaire and passed it along to Local 1576, asking 
Local 1576 to send the letter to PSE&G. Testimony 
indicated that System Council asked Local 1576 to send 
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the questionnaire in hopes of obtaining information to 
pursue further the "parallel workforce" grievance. See app. 
at 262. 
 
One of the in-house RPTs represented by Local 1576 
testified that beginning in approximately 1990, he worked 
side by side with independent RPTs and observed that they 
performed the same work and worked the same hours as 
the union-represented RPTs. See app. at 317-23. He 
further testified that the supervisors of the union RPT's 
supervised the independent RPTs and that these 
supervisors played an active role in selecting which 
independent RPTs were hired. Moreover, PSE&G's 
supervisors assigned the independent RPTs work, 
scheduled their work hours, and disciplined them when 
necessary. In addition, the union RPT testified that he 
personally observed independent RPTs working for PSE&G 
during non-outage periods and that he had personal 
knowledge that both Bartlett and Numanco employees had 
remained with PSE&G for at least two years. He also 
testified that from 1990 to 1993, the number of union- 
represented RPTs at PSE&G either had decreased or 
remained the same. Id. 
 
According to Local 1576, it sent PSE&G the letter and 
questionnaire prepared by International on May 18, 1993, 
based on the above information in order to investigate 
whether PSE&G's use of independent RPTs was affecting 
union-represented RPTs adversely. See app. at 286-89 
(testimony of Local 1576's president); see also app. at 134- 
43 (letter and questionnaire). The letter expressed concern 
that PSE&G's use of Bartlett and Numanco and their 
employees was affecting the RPTs that Local 1576 
represented adversely as the "operations erode the 
bargaining unit, endanger the financial integrity of 
negotiated wages and fringe benefits, and threaten union 
member's jobs." Id. at 134. The letter requested that 
PSE&G fill out the attached questionnaire requesting 
information concerning the financial and/or managerial 
relationship between PSE&G and Bartlett. 
 
On June 11, 1993, PSE&G responded to Local 1576's 
letter stating that PSE&G does not operate and/or control 
either Bartlett or Numanco. See app. at 144-46. PSE&G's 
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letter further stated that "unless you can provide us with 
objective facts which establish that the information 
requested is relevant to the performance of your obligation 
as the collective bargaining representative of our employees, 
we do not intend to respond." Id. at 145. PSE&G asserted 
that because the collective bargaining agreement authorized 
its use of Bartlett and Numanco and did not affect the RPTs 
represented by Local 1576 adversely, its arrangement with 
Bartlett did not violate the collective bargaining agreement. 
Id. PSE&G also noted that because the accusations in Local 
1576's letter would be encompassed in the pending 
"parallel workforce" grievance, the letter was not a good 
faith inquiry. Id. PSE&G further accused Local 1576 of 
encouraging it to enter into a "hot cargo" agreement, i.e., an 
illegal agreement whereby an employer agrees with a union 
to cease doing business with companies based on their 
non-union status. Id. 
 
A representative of PSE&G testified that after Local 1576 
sent its letter he spoke with a representative of Local 1576 
who told him that he simply was doing his job in sending 
the letter and that "this was an International thing that . . . 
[they] wanted him to sign and he signed it." App. at 361. 
The Local 1576 representative testified that he remembered 
this conversation but denied that he made the particular 
statements attributed to him. 
 
By letter dated August 30, 1993, Local 1576 responded 
to PSE&G's June 11, 1993 letter. See app. at 147-48. Local 
1576 clarified that it was seeking information to investigate 
the extent to which PSE&G was using non-union personnel 
to perform work covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement. Local 1576 explained that this information was 
relevant to establish if "so called, contract employees, . . . 
may, in fact, be bargaining unit personnel." Id. at 147. 
Local 1576 also asserted that this matter was entirely 
separate from the pending "parallel workforce" grievance 
between the parties. The letter concluded by stating"I trust 
this will clarify any further questions you may have had 
and that the overdue information will be forthcoming in a 
timely manner." Id. at 148. 
 
PSE&G responded to Local 1576's August 30 letter by 
letter dated September 19, 1993. See app. at 149. PSE&G 
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asserted that more specifics were required for it to 
determine whether it should furnish the requested 
information. Specifically, PSE&G quoted allegations from 
Local 1576's May 18, 1993 letter and stated that"[y]ou now 
more simply contend that unnamed persons are performing 
unidentified work normally performed by represented 
employees." Id. The letter concluded by stating: 
 
       Both the generality of this charge, and your failure to 
       specify the information which Local 1576 believes it 
       needs to police the collective bargaining agreement, 
       prevent us from responding to your request. More 
       specifics are required before it can be determined 
       whether the Union has requested relevant information 
       which [PSE&G] either possesses or has a duty to 
       disclose. 
 
Id. This letter was the last correspondence between the 
parties prior to this litigation; PSE&G never provided the 
requested information and Local 1576 did not send further 
requests for the information. 
 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On March 4, 1994, International filed a charge with the 
Board alleging that PSE&G violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) 
of the NLRA by refusing to provide the requested 
information which was purportedly necessary for and 
relevant to the representation of certain of PSE&G's 
employees. The Board issued a complaint based on this 
charge on July 22, 1994, and amended that complaint on 
July 31, 1994. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a 
hearing on the complaint on October 15 and 16, 1996. 
 
The ALJ held that by refusing to provide the information 
that Local 1576 requested, PSE&G violated Section 8(a)(5) 
and (1) of the NLRA. The ALJ accordingly issued an order 
dated January 28, 1997, requiring PSE&G to furnish the 
requested information. PSE&G filed exceptions to the ALJ's 
order with the Board. By Decision and Order dated July 11, 
1997, the Board adopted the ALJ's decision and 
recommended order but modified the order to require 
PSE&G to "[f]urnish to the Union in a timely fashion the 
information requested by the Union in its letter and 
questionnaire dated May 18, 1993." The Board filed a 
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petition for enforcement of its July 11, 1997 Order with this 




PSE&G asserts three points of error in this appeal. The 
first relates to procedural defects with International's unfair 
labor practice charge; PSE&G asserts that International did 
not file the charge timely and that the charge was not 
served properly. PSE&G's second point of error takes issue 
with the ALJ's finding that PSE&G was required to respond 
to the questionnaire because the requested information was 
relevant to aiding Local 1576 in fulfilling its duties as the 
representative of PSE&G's RPTs. PSE&G makes the final 
claim that Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co., 317 
N.L.R.B. 1266 (1995), mandates a result contrary to that 
reached by the ALJ, and thus the Board, in this case. 
 
A. Procedural Defects in Filing and Serving the Unfair 
Practice Charge 
 
As we have indicated, PSE&G's initial assignments of 
error relate to alleged procedural defects in International's 
unfair practices charge. Specifically, PSE&G asserts that 
this charge was untimely filed and improperly served. 
 
       1. Assertion that Charge Was Untimely 
 
Section 10(b) of the NLRA provides that "no complaint 
shall issue upon any unfair labor practice occurring more 
than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the 
Board . . . ." 29 U.S.C. S 160(b). The Board has held that 
the six-month limitation period begins to run when an 
aggrieved party has "clear and unequivocal notice" of a 
violation of the NLRA. See A & L Underground, 302 N.L.R.B. 
467, 468 (1991). Several courts of appeals have recognized 
and applied the clear and unequivocal notice rule. See, e.g., 
Taylor Warehouse Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.3d 892, 899 (6th Cir. 
1996); United States Can Co. v. NLRB, 984 F.2d 864, 867 
(7th Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Jerry Durham Drywall, 974 F.2d 
1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1992); NLRB v. Glover Bottled Gas 
Corp., 905 F.2d 681, 684 (2d Cir. 1990). As one court aptly 
noted: 
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       The 10(b) period begins when the victim of an unfair 
       labor practice receives unequivocal notice of a final 
       adverse decision. Rumors or suspicions will not do 
       . . . . Moreover, the decision must be final, and not 
       subject to further change; knowledge that another 
       party might commit an unfair labor practice when the 
       time is right will not start the 10(b) period. While the 
       victims of an unfair labor practice should be 
       encouraged to file a charge with the NLRB as soon as 
       possible, individuals should not be forced to file 
       anticipatory or premature charges, challenging 
       tentative or merely hypothetical decisions, in order to 
       protect their statutory rights. The 10(b) period does not 
       commence until an aggrieved party has knowledge of 
       the facts necessary to support a present, ripe, unfair 
       labor practice charge. 
 
Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 746 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 
Because the six-month limitations period functions as an 
affirmative defense to an unfair practice charge the party, 
in this case PSE&G, relying on the defense has the burden 
of proof to establish the untimeliness of the charge. See 
Jerry Durham, 974 F.2d at 1004; A & L Underground, 302 
N.L.R.B. at 469. Moreover, to establish the defense, PSE&G 
must prove that the factual conclusions of the ALJ were 
erroneous by convincing us that substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole does not support the conclusions. 
See, e.g., Taylor, 98 F.2d at 900; Glover Bottled Gas, 905 F. 
2d at 685; see also NLRB v. Joy Tech., Inc., 990 F.2d 104, 
107-08 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the substantial evidence 
standard of review is applicable to the Board's factual 
findings). 
 
PSE&G asserts that Local 1576 had notice that PSE&G 
was refusing to provide answers to International's 
questionnaire when it received PSE&G's June 11, 1993 
letter initially replying to Local 1576's request for 
information. Thus, in its view, because International did 
not file the unfair practice charge until March 4, 1994, its 
filing was untimely. PSE&G supports its position by 
pointing to testimony by the president of Local 1576 that he 
knew when he received PSE&G's June 11, 1993 letter that 
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PSE&G was not going to answer the questionnaire and that 
he did not think that his August 30, 1993 letter would 
change that status. See appellant's brief at 15-16; app. at 
307-08. In addition, PSE&G discounts the import of its 
September 19 letter refusing to provide the requested 
information by citing to International Union, United Auto, 
Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of America, AFL- 
CIO v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the 
court held that an "attorney's reaffirmation of the 
Company's position arising out of a past action should not 
ordinarily of itself be sufficient to constitute a reoccurrence 
for the purpose of a limitation provision." 
 
In addressing this issue, the ALJ found the charge timely 
filed. Applying the "clear and unequivocal" notice standard, 
the ALJ found that the language in PSE&G's June 11 letter 
"left open the possibility that [PSE&G] would comply with 
the request upon receipt of . . . `objective facts' . . ." 
showing how the information sought was relevant to Local 
1576's duty as the employees' bargaining representative. 
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Local 1576 did not have 
clear and unequivocal evidence that PSE&G was engaging 
in unlawful conduct by June 11, 1993. In addition, the ALJ 
held that even if an unfair labor practice charge could have 
been filed as a result of PSE&G's June 11, 1993 letter, that 
did not mean that an unfair labor practice charge based on 
PSE&G's subsequent refusal in its September 19, 1993 
letter to provide the information requested was precluded. 
See generally, Rest Haven Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 617, 618 
(1989) (holding that the Board did not err in finding a 
continuing violation where there was active conduct by the 
parties during the six-month limitations period). 
 
Substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports 
the ALJ's finding that PSE&G's June 11, 1993 letter did not 
provide Local 1576 with clear and unequivocal notice that 
PSE&G was engaging in unlawful conduct. PSE&G's June 
11, 1993 letter specifically left open the possibility that 
PSE&G would furnish the requested information if Local 
1576 provided it with "objective facts which establish that 
the information requested is relevant to the performance of 
your obligation as the collective bargaining representative of 
our employees." See app. at 145. Because the six-month 
 
                                11 
  
limitations period is not meant to punish a party who 
delays in filing due to the ambiguous conduct of another 
party, International's charge should be considered timely 
filed. See A & L Underground, 302 N.L.R.B. at 469. The 
testimony relating to Local 1576's representative's 
subjective belief as to whether PSE&G ever would furnish 
the requested information should not alter this result; this 
evidence is not strong enough to overcome the ALJ's 
findings which are based solidly on the equivocal language 
of PSE&G's June 11, 1993 letter. 
 
2. Assertion that Charge Was Improperly Served 
 
PSE&G also asserts that International's charge was not 
served properly. Specifically, PSE&G asserts that because 
the record is devoid of proof of when the charge was served, 
the union has failed to carry its burden to establish 
jurisdiction. The Board counters that PSE&G is barred from 
raising this argument because it failed to object to service 
before the Board. The Board also asserts that, in any event, 
the claim is without merit because its Regional Director 
notified PSE&G by letter dated March 7, 1994, that a 
charge had been filed against it. 
 
As noted by the ALJ, the Board sent PSE&G a letter 
dated March 7, 1994, notifying PSE&G that a charge had 
been filed against it. See supp. app. at 3-4 (March 7, 1994 
letter). The letter also stated that a copy of the charge was 
being sent to PSE&G with the letter. Id. The return receipt 
for this letter reflects that PSE&G's agent received it on 
March 8, 1994. Because this evidence is sufficient to 
sustain the ALJ's finding that the charge was served 
properly, PSE&G's assertion of error on this point lacks 
merit. 
 
B. Allegation that Local 1576 Was Requesting Information 
Solely for International 
 
The parties agree that PSE&G had a duty to supply the 
requested information if it was relevant to aid Local 1576 in 
fulfilling its duties as the union representative for its 
members. See generally, NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 
432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 568 (1967) (noting that "[t]here 
can be no question of the general obligation of an employer 
to provide information that is needed by the bargaining 
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representative for the proper performance of its duties."). 
PSE&G contends, however, that Local 1576 did not make 
its request for information in good faith because it had no 
interest in obtaining the information; according to PSE&G, 
Local 1576 really was requesting the information solely on 
behalf of International so that International could use the 
information in its attempts to organize the employees of 
independent contracting firms. See brief at 18-25. 
 
The ALJ held that Local 1576 satisfied its burden of 
showing that it reasonably believed that the requested 
information was relevant to its statutory duties. 
Specifically, the ALJ accepted the union RPT's testimony 
that PSE&Gs' supervisors were controlling the independent 
RPTs, these employees were being retained for up to two 
years and during non-outage periods, and these employees 
were performing the same type of work as the union- 
represented RPTs. On the basis of this evidence, the ALJ 
found that Local 1576 reasonably could have believed that 
the allegedly independent RPTs were actually bargaining 
unit employees that PSE&G was using to circumvent the 
collective bargaining agreement. The ALJ also noted that 
the information requested would be relevant to help Local 
1576 determine whether these employees were performing 
bargaining unit work thereby diminishing the work to 
which Local 1576's members were entitled. The ALJ further 
noted that the information sought was relevant to Local 
1576's pending "parallel workforce" grievance against 
PSE&G. 
 
The ALJ specifically rejected PSE&G's argument that 
Local 1576 requested the information solely for 
International's benefit. The ALJ noted that PSE&G offered 
no evidence to substantiate its claim that Local 1576 was 
without knowledge or did not approve of the filing of the 
charge on its behalf. In addition, the ALJ found that 
PSE&G was not relieved of its duty to supply information 
relevant to Local 1576's role as representative of PSE&G's 
employees simply because the information also might have 
benefited International. See generally, NLRB v. Associated 
Gen. Contractors, 633 F.2d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that the potential use of requested information for 
organizational purposes does not relieve an employer of its 
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duty to supply the information if it is relevant); Central 
Manor Home for Adults, 320 N.L.R.B. 1009, 1011 (1996) 
(noting that if information is relevant to the union's duties, 
it is not germane that the information may be requested for 
other reasons). The ALJ also credited the testimony 
indicating that International had abandoned efforts to 
organize the independent RPTs and reasoned that this 
testimony undermines PSE&G's position that the 
information was for International's benefit. 
 
The Board asserts that there is substantial evidence to 
support the ALJ's finding that the requested information 
was relevant in aiding Local 1576 to represent its members. 
Specifically, the Board points to the testimony on which the 
ALJ relied relating to the type of work and the supervision 
of the independent RPTs at PSE&G. In addition, the Board 
points to evidence that the number of union-represented 
RPTs at PSE&G had remained stagnant since 1990 while 
the total number of positions increased. The Board argues 
that, in light of this evidence, the requested information 
was relevant to determining: (1) whether PSE&G or Bartlett 
was the true employer of the independent contracting 
employees; (2) whether PSE&G was allowing these 
employees to perform union work; (3) whether PSE&G  was 
in breach of the collective bargaining agreement by failing 
to extend certain benefits to these employees; and (4) the 
strength of Local 1576's "parallel workforce" grievance 
against PSE&G. 
 
The standard for relevance is cases such as this is not 
demanding; it has been characterized as a "discovery-type" 
standard. Acme, 385 U.S. at 437 n.6, 87 S.Ct. at 568 n.6; 
NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 144, 150 (3d 
Cir. 1991). In addition, our standard of review is 
deferential; the ALJ's factual determinations are entitled to 
a substantial degree of deference. See generally, NLRB v. 
George Koch Sons, Inc., 950 F.2d 1324, 1330-32 (7th Cir. 
1991) (upholding Board's decision in similar refusal to 
provide information case and noting that the issue is 
predominately factual and subject to a significant degree of 
deference). Under these standards, the record evidence 
identified by the ALJ and by the Board in its brief on appeal 
substantially support the ALJ's findings that the 
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information that Local 1576 requested was relevant to its 
duties and that Local 1576 adopted the International 
questionnaire for purposes of obtaining this information. In 
addition, as noted by the ALJ, it is irrelevant that the 
information also may have benefited International. See, e.g., 
Associated Gen. Contractors, 633 F.2d at 772; Central 
Manor Home for Adults, 320 N.L.R.B. at 1011. 
Consequently, PSE&G's assignment of error on this point 
lacks merit. 
 
C. Application of Connecticut Yankee 
 
PSE&G further asserts that the Board's decision in 
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 1226 
(1995), is indistinguishable from this case and mandates a 
reversal of the ALJ's decision. In Connecticut Yankee, a 
union brought an unfair labor practice act against a utility 
for refusing to answer International's questionnaire. After 
International sent the company its questionnaire, the 
company initially responded by denying any financial 
relationship with Bartlett and refusing to answer the 
majority of questions on the questionnaire. International 
responded by asserting that the information was relevant to 
determine whether the utility and Bartlett were joint 
employers which would subject Bartlett to the collective 
bargaining agreement between the parties. 
 
The Board held that the utility did not violate the NLRA 
by refusing to respond to the questionnaire because 
International had failed to carry its burden of proving that 
the requested information was relevant. The Board initially 
noted that under the collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties, a joint employer relationship would not 
subject Bartlett to the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement unless the parties consented. Because there was 
no record of the required consent by the parties, the Board 
reasoned that the information requested by the 
questionnaire was not relevant to enforcement of the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
The Board further held that the evidence was insufficient 
to support a finding that the utility's use of Bartlett's 
employees affected the union-represented RPTs. 
Specifically, the Board noted that the record revealed that 
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the number of bargaining unit positions at the utility had 
increased substantially during the time period in question. 
The Board further noted that there was no allegation that 
union-represented RPTs had lost continuous employment 
or permanent promotional opportunities. The Board also 
noted that the union never had filed a grievance concerning 
the utility's use of Bartlett personnel. 
 
We agree with the ALJ that Connecticut Yankee is 
distinguishable from this case. First, the theory of relevance 
for the requested information in Connecticut Yankee was 
very different from the theory advanced in this case. 
Because the relevance inquiry is fact specific, the Board's 
relevancy analysis in Connecticut Yankee based on a joint 
employer theory is largely inapposite. In addition, testimony 
was offered that PSE&G's use of the independent RPTs was 
affecting union-represented RPTs adversely; independent 
RPTs were being retained for long periods of time and 
performing the same work and the number of union- 
represented RPTs was remaining stagnant. In addition, 
Local 1576 had filed a parallel work force grievance to 
which the requested information would be relevant. For 
these reasons, the ALJ properly held that the Board's 




For the foregoing reasons we reject all of PSE&G's 
contentions and will enter a judgment enforcing the order 
of July 11, 1997. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                16 
 
